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I. Introduction

In various incarnations, egalitarianism has been a fundamental concern of
economic policy for most of the twentieth century.1 The egalitarian
impulse—and its corollary, opposition to the stark inequalities of free
market capitalism—was embodied in both Soviet-style socialism and socialdemocratic Keynesianism as they developed, primarily in the first quartercentury after the end of World War II. Both models achieved major successes
in a range of countries, especially through the 1960s. Countries with Soviettype economies attained high growth rates and the majority of people living
in them enjoyed rising living standards, including income, job, health and
housing security. The social-democratic/Keynesian approach also succeeded
in reducing inequality, increasing security, as well as contributing to the
dampening of the capitalist business cycle.2
However, both models also contained several basic contradictions. Among
the most evident were the dictatorial political foundations of the Soviet
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model and its related incapacity to shift from an initial phase of largescale industrialization to one based on innovations in production processes and product designs. For its part, the Keynesian model has been
unable to reverse the trends of declining growth and increased mass
unemployment in advanced economies. The Soviet model has completely
collapsed under the weight of such contradictions and social-democratic
Keynesianism has been in eclipse since the 1970s.3 Neither model now
offers a viable basis for a renewed egalitarian project.
Progressive political movements have been weakened by the absence of
coherent egalitarian economic programmes. In this absence, progressive
movements are unable to specify a broad-based policy agenda they
support. Such a lacuna is especially damaging given that support for the
Left has again begun to grow, as the full implications of Reaganism,
Thatcherism, IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programmes and
Eastern European free-market shock therapy are no longer matters of
speculation.
This paper pursues a new approach to egalitarian economic policy. It is
concerned with methods of bringing dramatic increases in the democratic control over financial markets and the allocation of credit, without
sacrificing the basic sources of micro efficiency and macro coordination
and stability that are necessary for any viable economic strategy. The
focus here on financial issues is not meant to suggest that there is less
need for comparable policy measures in other economic spheres, in particular the labour market and related institutions. Nevertheless, the
premise of this paper is that policies focused on financial institutions
and activities must be a central feature of any renewed egalitarian policy
project.
There are several reasons why this is so. To begin with, it has been clear
for some time that even the most mildly progressive governments face
formidable opposition to their programmes from powerful interests
within financial markets. Some well-known examples of this recurring
phenomenon include the Labour governments in Britain in the 1930s,
1960s and 1970s, the Mitterand government in France in the 1980s, and,
1
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Andrew Glyn, Ilene Grabel, John Grahl, Marty Hart-Landsberg, Michael Howard,
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conference on ‘Demand Rehabilitation: Finance, Trade and Technology’, sponsored by Pantheon Sorbonne Paris 1 and SOAS, University of London. I am also
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2
Some standard evidence on these indicators is summarized in Robert Pollin and
Alexander Cockburn, ‘Capitalism and its Spectres: The World, the Free Market
and the Left’, The Nation, 21 February 1991, pp. 224–36.
3
See Perry Anderson and Patrick Camiller, eds, Mapping the West European Left,
London, Verso 1994, and Andrew Glyn, ‘Social Democracy and Full
Employment’, NLR, no. 211, pp. 33–55 for a range of perspectives on the condition of West European social democracy.
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most recently, the Clinton Presidency in the US.4 Third World governments regularly confront even stronger pressures, especially since the
1980s, as the IMF and World Bank have imposed deflationary structural
adjustment programmes on terms established by the international financial community.
But even assuming that such political forces could be neutralized, the tendency of financial markets toward speculation and instability have also
weakened the capacity of governments to successfully implement
egalitarian macroeconomic policies. The primary instruments for conducting macro policy—deficit spending and central bank monetary interventions—are both financial mechanisms, and thus their ability to operate
effectively depends on how well policy initiatives can be transmitted
through the financial system. Financial market instability has increased
substantially since the early 1970s relative to the first phase of the postwar
period, including such period-defining events as the collapse of the
Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, the Latin American debt crisis
in the early 1980s, and the merger and takeover wave in the US and UK in
the latter part of the 1980s. This rise of financial instability has weakened
the transmission mechanism from policy instruments to policy targets.
Given these considerations, it follows that egalitarian movements will
have to confront financial market pressures through explicit programmatic measures. Yet, in contrast to the situation with labour-market issues,
the Left has for the most part failed to even consider seriously the types
of policies that might be effective in addressing both the political and
structural problems deriving from financial markets. There are also more
positive reasons for egalitarians to pay attention to polices focused on the
financial system. Finance is the conduit for all economic activity in market
economies. Because nothing happens unless it is financed, exerting
control over the financial system is an efficient way to influence the widest
possible range of activity with a set of relatively modest and simple policy
tools.
Moreover, many researchers have now observed that there are considerable differences in the financial systems operating within the various
capitalist economies. What has emerged from this research is that some
financial systems—in particular what are often called the ‘bank-based’
systems—have been more successful than others—the ‘capital marketbased’ systems—in promoting long-term growth and financial stability.
The basis for the success of the bank-based systems is their reliance on
non-market arrangements in organizing financial institutions. These nonmarket arrangements continue to operate, moreover, despite the wave of
financial market globalization and liberalization that has been gaining
4
The Clinton administration’s abdication before financial market pressures is
chronicled in great detail in Bob Woodward, The Agenda, New York 1994.
Woodward portrays both Clinton and the relatively progressive members of his
administration as truly stunned by the power of financial markets to override his
electoral mandate. Clinton, for example, at one point declares, ‘You mean to tell
me that the success of the program and my reelection hinges on the Federal
Reserve and a bunch of fucking bond traders?’ (p. 84). He later concludes, ‘Here
we help the bond market and we hurt the people who voted us in.’ (p. 91.)
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momentum at least since the collapse of Bretton Woods. While these
bank-based systems have not been constructed to advance egalitarian
aims, the principle argument of the paper is that they can be successfully
adapted for that purpose once their central operating mechanisms are
understood and appropriately redeployed.
Following this introduction, the paper is organized into three main sections. Section two surveys the literature on bank-based and capital-market
based financial systems. In general, this literature finds that bank-based
systems, such as those in Japan, France, Germany and South Korea have
been more successful than capital market-based systems, such as those as
in the US and UK, in solving the incentive, coordination and informational
problems inherent in capitalist economies, and indeed in all complex economic systems. Because of this, bank-based systems are better equipped
to promote longer time horizons and a stable financial environment.
Their structures also create more favourable conditions for activist
government policy interventions, including both traditional macro policies and public credit allocation policies. At the same time, the bank-based
systems generally operate through highly undemocratic public and private
bureaucracies, which are clearly inimical to any egalitarian policy project.
The challenge, then, is to develop policy approaches which can combine
the efficiency-promoting aspects of bank-based systems with a degree of
democratic participation in the financial system not yet attempted in existing models.
Section three takes up this challenge. The angle through which it
approaches this issue is to reexamine the different financial systems
according to the exit/voice analytic framework developed by Hirschman.5
In this framework, exit is the withdrawal from a relationship with a person
or organization when one becomes dissatisfied with that relationship.
Voice means directly expressing one’s dissatisfaction to the relevant
person or organization. In capitalist societies, the exercise of exit is pervasive within market relationships, while the political and bureaucratic
spheres are dominated by the exercise of voice. Within this framework,
the fundamental distinction between financial systems can be seen to be
not whether they are bank- or capital market-based, but rather whether
they are dominated by exit or voice mechanisms. The bank-based systems
are voice-led, and therefore provide more effective channels for political
interventions in financial markets than do the exit-led capital market
systems. Working from this perspective, the principal concern in formulating egalitarian policies can be recast: the issue is not the specific bank or
capital market institutions prevailing in a financial system, but rather how
all systems can be restructured to provide an effective basis for the democratic exercise of voice.
Posing the question in this way, then, enables us to consider various
means of creating ‘democratic-voice’ mechanisms that also retain the efficiency and stability-promoting aspects of the existing bank-based financial structures, that is, the ‘elite voice’ systems. Drawing primarily from
recent literature on the US economy, I consider proposals in the areas of
5

Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms,
Organizations, and States, Cambridge, Mass. 1970.
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corporate governance, community reinvestment, pension-fund management, and central bank policy. However, I also stress that such democratic credit policies can be effective within a range of institutional
frameworks and political environments. Indeed, the adaptability of this
policy approach is one of its most important strengths. For example,
while such proposals have operated successfully on a limited scale within
the contemporary US economy, their effectiveness would probably
increase within an economy, such as the French, where a high proportion
of the major financial institutions are publicly owned.
In section four, I pose the following more general question: can the efficiency and stability-promoting features of a voice-led model be sustained
once we move from an elite to a democratic-voice system? I approach the
issue via the new model of ‘bank-centric’ market socialism developed by
Bardhan and Roemer.6 Working from their discussion provides a bridge for
engaging with the literature on market socialism in order to explore our
central concerns about the efficacy of a democratic-voice model.
The brief concluding section pulls together the main arguments in support
of such democratic-voice financial policies as a foundation for renewing
egalitarian economic policies. In passing, this section notes that globalization and liberalization of financial markets pose new challenges to the
viability of any bank-based or voice-led financial system. At the same time,
experiences thus far suggest ways that the essential features of a voice
system can be retained without having to resist all aspects of globalization.

II. Alternative Capitalist Financial Systems
1. Bank- and Capital Market-Based Systems
Beginning with Gershenkron’s classic essay, there has been a small but now
rapidly growing body of economic analysis which has attached significance
to differences in the financial systems of capitalist countries.7
Gershenkron, in particular, contrasted the financial development of
Britain and Germany. He argued that, because Britain’s industrialization
was early and gradual, businesses were financed primarily through reinvesting retained earnings. Large pools of intermediated saving had not yet
formed, making it impractical for firms to rely on external sources for longterm financing. As a result, in the British tradition, non-financial firms did
not develop close ties with financial institutions. When large financial
institutions did later begin to develop, they were independent entities, with
no special attachment to firms. The arm’s length relationship between
Britain’s non-financial and financial sectors established the foundation for
the country’s highly developed and independent capital market.8
6
Pranab Bardhan and John Roemer, ‘Market Socialism: A Case for Rejuvenation’,
Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 6, 1992, pp. 101–16.
7
Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective,
Cambridge, Mass. 1962.
8
Tom Nairn traces the origins of the weak linkages between industry and finance
in Britain even further back, to the era of the English revolution, during which the
old landed classes and finance capital united to prevent the industrial bourgeoisie
from controlling the state. Nairn, ‘The Decline of the British State’, NLR, 101–102,
February–April 1977, pp. 3–61.
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Gershenkron contrasts this pattern with that of Germany.
Industrialization started later there, and as a result, firms were confronted
with the problem of rapidly appropriating the capital technologies and
production systems, such as those for steel, that the British had already
developed. The firms were unable to finance these projects on their own
and, as a result, large universal banks developed. They provided firms
with both long-term funding as well as managerial direction. The universal banks were also able to coordinate the investment plans for the
clusters of firms with which they were associated. Within this development path, opportunities were far more limited than in Britain for the
formation of an independent capital market.9
As Jacobs points out, Gershenkron’s account does not attempt to explain
why the differences in the British and German systems were sustained
long after Germany attained a comparable level of development to that of
Britain.10 Nor does he pass judgement on the relative merits of either
system as a foundation for future development. However, in roughly the
last decade, a substantial literature has developed which has raised just
these questions.11 This literature has examined a wider set of countries
than those considered by Gershenkron, including the US, Japan and
9
Gershenkron’s historical account of the German experience conforms to the
contemporaneous observations of Rudolph Hilferding, Finance Capital: A Study of
the Latest Phase of Capitalist Development, London 1981 (first ed. 1891). However,
Hilferding’s analytic approach was mistaken for having regarded the German universal banking model as a more advanced and essentially inevitable stage through
which capitalist economies would proceed. This perspective underestimated the
durability of the British-type capital market model, as well as the evolution of
banking enterprises themselves. Laurence Harris provides a good discussion of
these issues. ‘Alternative Perspectives on the Financial System’, L. Harris, J.
Coakley, M. Croasdale, and T. Evans, eds, New Perspectives on the Financial System,
New York 1988, pp. 7–38.
10
Michael P. Jacobs, ‘National Financial Systems, Aggregate Investment, and the
Cost of Capital’, manuscript, Department of Economics, New School for Social
Research, 1994. This is comparable to the argument Ben Fine and Laurence Harris
make about Nairn’s thesis on the UK system—i.e. Nairn does not adequately
explain why the British system remained in place through various historical junctures when political opportunities existed for restructuring it. The Peculiarities of the
British Economy, London 1985.
11
Some of the leading studies in this literature include John Zysman, Government,
Markets and Growth: Financial Systems and the Politics of Industrial Change, Ithaca, 1983;
Tad M. Rybczynski, ‘Industrial Finance Systems in Europe, US and Japan’, Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 5, nos. 3–4, (1984) pp. 275–86; Andrew
Cox, ‘The State, Finance and Industry Relationship in Comparative Perspective’,
in A. Cox, ed., The State, Finance and Industry, Sussex 1986, pp. 1–59; Colin Mayer,
for instance, ‘New Issues in Corporate Finance’, European Economic Review, 32,
(1988) pp. 1167–89; Eric Berglöf, ‘Capital Structure as a Mechanism of Control: A
Comparison of Financial Systems’, in M. Aoki, B. Gustafsson and O.E.
Williamson, eds, The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties, London 1989, pp. 237–62; and
Michael Porter, for instance The Competitive Advantage of Nations, New York 1992.
Will Hutton’s The State We’re In, London 1995, is an excellent journalistic discussion of these issues, particularly as they relate to the contemporary British
economy. Recent studies examining these questions from political economy perspectives, and from which I have benefited substantially are Don Goldstein,
‘Financial Structure and Corporate Behavior in Japan and the US: Insulation vs.
Integration with Speculative Pressures’, manuscript, Department of Economics,
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France among the core group, and others as well, depending on the particular questions that a given study is pursuing.
This recent literature has continued to find useful the fundamental distinctions established by Gershenkron, between what we are calling ‘bankbased’ and ‘capital-market based’ financial systems. Most generally, the
capital market-based systems are characterized by highly developed
capital markets, with widely dispersed ownership of equity and debt
instruments, and relatively low involvement of large banks in either the
allocation of funds or the ownership of financial assets. The bank-based
systems, by contrast, are characterized by a small number of universal
banks that are actively involved in the long-term financing of investment
activity of the non-financial firms. The banks are the primary source of
long-term funds and they retain ownership for the long term of their debt
instruments. In these economies, there is relatively little secondary trading
of financial assets.
Beyond this, Zysman’s seminal contribution added a third dimension to
the distinction between these systems: the nature of government involvement within them.12 Zysman found strong differences in the role of
government between Japan, France, Germany, the UK and US, the five
countries he studied. In particular, he found that the government played a
more limited role in the US and UK capital market-based systems. France
and Japan, by contrast, were bank-based systems in which the government
participates actively in allocating credit to private firms, both on the basis
of price and quantity controls. Zysman argues that Germany is unique as
a bank-based system in which the government does not play an active role
in administering prices or quantities.
In contrasting the systems below, we begin by describing specific institutional features—that is, what distinguishes them as either bank or capital
market-based—but advance toward the goal of generalizing more broadly
about the two types of systems. I thus also describe the differences
between the systems according to whether they are ‘fluid’ (capital market)
or ‘dedicated’ (bank-based), and then, more expansively, according to
whether they are ‘exit’ or ‘voice’ led systems. At the same time, in generalizing this way about the nature of these systems, I do not mean to give the
impression that actual financial operations in the various countries have,
over the period considered, become frozen in place. At various points,
particularly in the conclusion, I discuss some of the ways that these
systems have recently evolved. Nor am I suggesting that differences in
financial systems can themselves explain overall differences in economic
performance. The Japanese or South Korean growth ‘miracles’, for
example, were crucially dependent on, among other things, initial support
Allegheny College, 1995; Ilene Grabel, ‘Saving and the Financing of Productive
Investment: The Importance of National Financial Complexes’, in R. Pollin ed.,
The Macroeconomics of Finance, Saving and Investment, Ann Arbor 1996 (forthcoming);
and Michael P. Jacobs, ‘National Financial Systems, Aggregate Investment, and
the Cost of Capital’ and ‘A Cluster Analysis of Twelve Countries’ Financial
Systems’, Essay I, Ph.D. Dissertation, New School for Social Research, 1994.
12
John Zysman, Government, Markets and Growth: Financial Systems and the Politics of
Industrial Change, Ithaca, NY 1983.
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from the US economy through spending on the Korean and Vietnam wars
and other factors, docile labour movements, well-specified export strategies, and strong commitments to spending on education.13 Nevertheless,
by focusing here on the issue of financial structure, I am clearly assigning
considerable significance to its relative importance as a determinant of
overall economic performance.
2. Effects of Alternative Systems
Why do these features of countries’ financial systems matter? The answer
first depends on the theoretical perspective from which one examines the
question. Given the neoclassical ‘irrelevance’ propositions developed by
Modigliani and Miller, financial structure should not matter at all in determining either the valuation of firms or, more generally, the pattern of
investment.14 This is because, in perfectly competitive markets, the same
product (a firm) will be priced equally in separate markets (debt and equity
markets). So there can be no advantage to firms or their asset holders
derived from the firm’s capital structure.
Because the Modigliani-Miller thesis assumes the existence of perfectly
competitive markets, it follows that ‘financial deepening’—the development of sophisticated financial markets through which the transaction
costs of reaching one’s optimal risk/reward profile are low—will enhance
efficiency. This was the view developed by MacKinnon and Shaw specifically with respect to the financial markets of less developed economies,
but their perspective applies generally.15 From this point of view, then,
one would conclude that the Anglo-Saxon capital market-based model of
deep and liberalized financial markets would attain superior results to the
bank-based systems such as France, Japan or Germany. In fact, most of
the literature has found the contrary to be the case: over a range of measures, the bank-based systems have out-performed the capital marketbased systems. What are the reasons for this?
13

For fuller treatments of these economies, see Makoto Itoh, The World Economic
Crisis and Japanese Capitalism, New York 1990 on Japan, and Alice Amsden, Asia’s
Next Giant, New York 1989, Martin Hart-Landsberg, The Rush to Development:
Economic Change and Political Struggle in South Korea, New York 1993 and Ha-Joon
Chang, The Political Economy of Industrial Policy, New York 1994 on South Korea.
14
Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller, ‘The Cost of Capital, Corporation
Finance, and the Theory of Investment’, American Economic Review, June 1958, pp.
261–95.
15
See Ronald MacKinnon, Money and Capital in Economic Development, Washington,
DC, 1973, and Edward S. Shaw, Financial Deepening in Economic Development, New
York 1973. Grabel presents, among other things, an illuminating survey of the
MacKinnon/Shaw thesis. Ilene Grabel, ‘Speculation-led Economic Development:
A Post-Keynesian Interpretation of Financial Liberalization Programs in the
Third World’, International Review of Applied Economics, vol. 9, no. 2, (1995), pp.
127–49. It is notable that MacKinnon himself has revised his position allowing
that some forms of state intervention may be needed to address problems of
asymmetric information. See for instance his ‘Macroeconomic Instability and
Moral Hazard in Banking in a Liberalizing Economy’, in P. Brock, M. Connolly
and C. Gonzalez-Vega, eds, Latin American Debt and Adjustment. External Shocks and
Macroeconomic Policies, London 1989, pp. 99–111.
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The literature here builds from a range of perspectives. Some of it, within
the Gershenkron tradition, is primarily historical and descriptive (for
instance Zysman and Cox). More explicit theoretical approaches are motivated by New Keynesian and New Institutionalist concerns with problems of information and principal/agent relationships, Post-Keynesian
ideas on uncertainty and financial fragility, and from what is increasingly
termed the ‘organizational capabilities’ view of the firm.16 Perhaps the
single most influential idea underlying this literature is traceable to Berle
and Means’s classic 1932 study of the development of US corporations.17
They argued that the growth of the corporate form of organization
would encourage a divergence in the interests of managers and owners—
what is now termed a principal/agent problem. The problem is that managers, as agents of a dispersed and unorganized set of owners within a
capital market-based financial system, will act on behalf of their own
interests which are not necessarily identical to, or even compatible with,
those of the firm’s owners. Managers, for example, may seek to maximize
their own salary, security, power and perquisites, rather than the shareholder’s value; this would constitute a classic instance of an incentive
incompatibility between principal and agent.
At least equally problematic is that, even if the Berle/Means-type incentive incompatibilities were resolved satisfactorily, this in itself is still not
likely to promote the long-term viability of the firm. The reasons for this
stem from the related problems of asymmetric information between
owners and managers, incentive incompatibilities between owners and the
firms workers, and the uncertainty that dominates the operations of
financial markets. To begin with, the information to which the shareholders tend to respond will be short-term financial indicators. These are not
necessarily congruent with the firm’s ability to produce desired products
at competitive costs, the basic determinant of the firm’s long-term viability. Shareholders will recognize obvious cost-reducing measures, such as
wage cuts or layoffs, and will respond favourably to these. Yet other
sources of long-term viability, such as the firm’s capacity to innovate technically and its ability to create a productive environment for its workers,
16

Stiglitz is a background reference on New Keynesian perspectives on informational problems and financial structure. See for instance Joseph E. Stiglitz, ‘Banks
vs. Markets as Mechanisms for Allocating and Coordinating Investment’, in J.A.
Roumasset and S. Barr, eds, The Economics of Cooperation: EastAsian Development and
the Case for Pro-Market Intervention, Boulder, 1992, pp. 15–38. For a discussion of
Post-Keynesian perspectives on uncertainty and financial fragility, see James
Crotty, ‘Are Keynesian Uncertainty and Macrotheory Compatible? Conventional
Decision Making, Institutional Structures and Conditional Stability in Keynesian
Macromodels’, in. G. Dymski and R. Pollin, eds, New Perspectives in Monetary
Macroeconomics: Explorations in the Tradition of Hyman P. Minsky, Ann Arbor, 1994,
pp. 105–142. For alternative versions of an ‘organizational capabilities’ view, see
Michael Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, New York 1990; and William
Lazonick, ‘Organizational Capabilities in American Industry: The Rise and
Decline of Managerial Capitalism’, Business and Economic History, (second series)
19, 1990, pp. 35–54, and ‘Controlling the Market for Corporate Control: The
Historical Significance of Managerial Capitalism’, Industrial and Corporate Change,
vol. 1, no. 3, (1992) pp. 445–88.
17
Adolph A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property, New York 1932.
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are likely to be unrewarded or even denigrated by shareholders. This is in
part a problem of asymmetric information, in that shareholders are not
adequately informed about the firm’s operations. But there is also the
perhaps more basic problem of incentive incompatibilities, or, in
straightforward terms, class conflict. Since longer-term sources of productive viability may not reduce costs in the short term, the benefits of
them will not flow to shareholders who are most interested in the shortterm capital gains stemming from rising asset prices. On the other hand,
the benefits of maintaining competitiveness through creating a productive work environment rather than wage-cutting and layoffs is clearly
in the interest of the firm’s workers.
Finally, as Post Keynesians have long argued, asset prices in deep capital
markets are heavily influenced, if not entirely dominated, by the activities
of speculators, whose only concern is to outguess the market, not evaluate a firm’s productive potential.18 Thus, far from enhancing the flow of
useful information between owners and managers, a deep and freely functioning financial market is more likely to encourage chronic bouts of
speculative financial excess or, in contemporary terminology, pervasive
‘coordination failures’.
The argument within the literature is that the bank-based systems resolve
these problems of asymmetric information, uncertainty and coordination
failure, as well as class conflict and other incentive incompatibilities more
successfully than the capital market-based systems. As a result, the bankbased systems achieve superior performance in three crucial areas: promoting longer time horizons, encouraging financial stability, and
providing a framework for the successful implementation of government
policy.
3. Time Horizons and Financial Stability
The most basic reason given in the literature for the superior performance
of the bank-based systems is that they foster long-term time horizons,
which in turn promote long-term productive investment. By contrast, the
capital market-based systems foster shorter time horizons, in that firms’
managers are primarily concerned with achieving the performance standards defined by the transactions-oriented capital markets.
It will be useful now to consider Porter’s terminology, in which the two
systems are distinguished according to whether they are ‘fluid’ or ‘dedicated’ capital systems. In the fluid capital systems, firms’ relationships
with capital suppliers are at arm’s length, so shareholders have limited
information and direct influence over managerial actions. Shareholders
and bondholders’ decisions are made on the basis of simple corporate
financial ratios and stock prices. Moreover, their interventions in the corporate governance process are primarily ex-post, for instance through the
sale of shares or the deterioration in bond ratings. Within this arrangement, managers are forced to follow the same standard financial measures
of performance.
18

This point is developed well in James Crotty, ‘Are Keynesian Uncertainty and
Macrotheory Compatible?
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In ‘dedicated capital’ systems, by contrast, the capital suppliers have
major stakes and long-term relationships with the non-financial firms.
This enables the capital suppliers to share a focus with managers on
technical expertise and building market positions. Capital suppliers are
thus able to exert ex-ante influence. The firms, in turn, benefit from
what Lazonick calls ‘financial commitment’, which he defines as a situation in which claimants to the firms’ revenues ‘will not enforce these
claims in ways that undermine the development and utilization of the
firms’ organizational capabilities’.19 With this type of financial commitment associated with dedicated capital systems, the factors that are
conducive to high performance among workers—including less hierarchical work structures and long-term employment security—have a far
greater opportunity to develop. In addition, the ex-ante flow of
information and control in dedicated capital systems induces a greater
tolerance on the part of the lenders and investors for higher leverage
ratios. At the same time, the capital market-based systems are more susceptible to financial instability than the bank-based systems. Why is this
so? The underlying source of financial instability, at the simplest level
of accounting, must be that debt commitments are systematically outstripping the income flows necessary to service them. In turn, the basic
explanation for the systematic deviation between debt commitments
and income flows is that borrowed funds are used disproportionately
to finance activities that do not yield an adequate return flow of
income. The types of debt-financed activities most likely to create such
a debt trap are speculative and compensatory spending, that is, borrowing to purchase existing assets with the expectation of capital gain
and to compensate for declining income streams or other internally
generated funds. Put another way, instability results when debt is used
insufficiently to finance productive spending, that is, spending that
raises incomes by enhancing the productive capacity of firms and individuals. When credit is extended for speculative and compensatory
spending to a disproportionate degree relative to productive spending,
the likely result will be income streams inadequate to finance the
growth of debt.20 Note here that the basic source of difficulties is not
the rise of debt per se, nor even the rise of debt relative to income or
assets. High leverage ratios are sustainable as long as, over time, a
return flow of revenue is generated to service them.
As a general model, the bank-based systems are better designed to
avoid such mismatches between debt commitments and income flows
since, with finances more committed to long-term projects, speculative
impulses are weakened. This in turn means that projects will have a
longer grace period before they have to generate returns to their
lenders.
19

Lazonick, ‘Organizational Capabilities in American Industry’, p. 51.
The most influential contemporary perspective on financial instability has been
developed by Hyman P. Minsky, for instance in Stabilizing an Unstable Economy,
New Haven, 1986. For various perspectives on and developments from the
Minsky approach, see Steven Fazzari and Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, eds, Financial
Conditions and Macroeconomic Performance: Essays in Honor of Hyman P. Minsky,
Armonk, NY 1992, and Gary Dymski and Robert Pollin, eds, New Perspectives in
Monetary Macroeconomics: Explorations in the Tradition of Hyman P. Minsky, Ann Arbor,
1994.
20

36

4. Evidence on Time Horizons and Financial Stability
Time Horizons, Cost of Capital and Investment
A wide range of research has accumulated in recent years supporting the
view that the bank-based systems have promoted longer time horizons
and greater financial stability. To begin with, survey evidence of corporate
chief executive officers (CEOs) in the US, Japan and Europe developed by
Poterba and Summers found that American CEOs believe that their time
horizons are shorter than those for their counterparts in Europe and
Japan.21 These managers claim that their relatively short horizons derive
to a significant extent from the financial market environment in which
they operate, since they believe that US equity markets undervalue longterm investments. Were the firms valued more in accordance with the perceptions of managers, they believe that their long-term investments
would increase, on average, by perhaps as much as 20 per cent.
The survey also found that for the US CEOs, the minimum expected rate of
return that would induce them to commit to a new investment project—
i.e. the ‘hurdle rate’—is substantially higher than standard cost-of-capital
analysis would suggest. On average, CEOs in the US reported that their
hurdle rate was 12.2 per cent. This compares with an average real return
over the past fifty years of less than 2 per cent on corporate bonds and
around 7 per cent for equities.
Moreover, as Porter reports, this difference in time frames and hurdle
rates is associated with a striking difference in managerial goals: US managers rank return on investment and higher stock prices as their top two
corporate objectives, whereas Japanese managers rank improving existing
products or introducing new ones, and increasing market share as their
two highest priorities.22 Higher stock prices are ranked last by Japanese
managers among the eight objectives included in the study.
These survey findings are also consistent with evidence from corporations’ actual operations. Porter found that the share of investment going
to research and development, intangibles (especially investment in ‘corporate training and human resources’) and plant and equipment is lower
in the US than in Germany and Japan. In addition, the proportion of total
research and development expenditures going to long-term projects is
lower in the US. In the US, 22.6 per cent of total R&D budgets were allocated to such projects, while in Japan and Europe, the figures were 46.8
and 60.5 per cent respectively.23
Related to this, recent studies also find that short-term financial market
pressures have created formidable obstacles to developing ‘high-performance’ work environments, despite the increasingly widespread recogni21
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tion of the long-term gains that are achievable through a more secure and
less hierarchical workplace. Thus, Appelbaum and Berg report on the
results of a 1995 survey of senior line and human resource executives at
mid-sized and large US companies. The survey found that 98 per cent of
respondents agreed that improving employee performance would significantly improve business results while 73 per cent said that their company’s
most important investment was in people. Still, when asked to rank a
number of business priorities, the respondents put performance of
people and investment in people near the end of the list, well below standard measures of financial performance.24
Considering more direct financial indicators, at least over the 1970s and
1980s, various studies have found that the real after-tax cost of capital was
higher in the US than Japan and Germany, and that differences in these
countries’ financial systems are seen as a major contributing factor.
McCauley and Zimmer, for example, write that greater integration of
industry and finance has permitted higher leverage without raising bankruptcy risks equivalently, and also greatly reduced liquidity risks of nonfinancial firms. Moreover, the Japanese and German governments are
more actively involved in mitigating the direct costs associated with nonfinancial firms’ periods of financial distress.25
Mergers, Takeovers and Speculation
It is consistent with these general findings that the bank-based systems
almost fully avoided the corporate mergers, buyouts and takeovers that
were pervasive within the US and the UK in the 1980s. Indeed, according to
the work of Michael Jensen, the most influential mainstream analyst of
the 1980s merger and buyout wave, the phenomenon in the US and the UK
represented precisely an effort to resolve the principal/agent problems
resulting from the Anglo-American financial system. This effort was
almost entirely salutary in Jensen’s view.26
Jensen argues that the market for corporate control, and the corporate
restructurings it has forced, remedies the incentive, coordination and
informational problems of the Anglo-American corporate form using
straightforward means: limiting the prerogatives of managers and increasing the control of owners. Managers are forced to face constant threats to
their power and position, and are therefore much more responsive to
shareholders’ interests. This view also holds that the substitution of debt
for equity is a powerful tool for reducing management authority over
unutilized cash flow because, unlike dividend payments to equity owners,
managers are legally bonded to distribute interest payments on their debt.
24
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Following this perspective, one would expect that the enormous investment in corporate takeovers in the 1980s would have generated comparably large net benefits to the US and UK economies. While considerable
controversy exists over evaluating the outcome, a careful survey by Crotty
and Goldstein of the US experience found that the overall social costs far
exceeded the benefits:
The evidence is mounting that the costs of creating and allocating
credit through the deregulated financial markets of the 1980s are
likely to be significant and persistent. In many cases, employees in
merged firms suffered a direct loss of security, income and/or jobs.
The spill overs from these losses have been substantial; communities have suffered, and workers’ commitment to productivity
growth has been badly shaken. Productivity is threatened also by
the constraining effects of debt on investment and R&D expenditures. And finally, the financial stability and flexibility of industrial
and commercial companies and financial institutions throughout
the economy has been impaired.27
This is not to say that speculative finance is absent in the bank-based
systems. The 1980s inflation of the Japanese stock market and its crash in
1989 provide dramatic evidence that volatility there is comparable to that
in the US and uk.28 But the crucial point is that, because of the close relationship between financial and non-financial firms in bank-based systems,
speculative financial behavior does not exert significant influence on real
economic activity. In Japan itself, for example, controlling blocks of many
firms’ shares are held among strategic partners within Keiretsu, the bankindustry clusters. Yet roughly 40 per cent of corporate stock is held by
non-allied shareholders. This segment of the Japanese market is even
more engaged in short-term trading than the US market, with the net
result being that overall trading volume and turnover are very similar in
the two countries. Goldstein describes the Japanese financial market as
strongly bifurcated into fluid and dedicated segments, with the latter still
exercising predominant influence.

5. Economic Policy under Alternative Systems
Broadly speaking, bank-based systems are structured more suitably than
capital market-based systems for achieving favourable results from two
primary policy tools—expansionary policy and industrial strategy. The
basic source of the advantages inherent in bank-based systems is the greater
integration between non-financial and financial firms, which engenders a
commonality of purpose that is absent in capital market-based systems.
27
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Expansionary Macro Policy
In bank-based systems, since banks hold equity positions and are active in
the management of firms, the banks, along with the non-financial firms,
will be more favourably disposed toward expansionary macro policies. In
the Anglo-American system, where financial firms are not directly linked
to industry, the financial firms are more likely to favour restrictive policies.
The value of outstanding financial assets are more important to the
Anglo-American financial firms than the growth prospects of non-financial firms, and as such, they are more concerned about the threat of inflation than comparable institutions in bank-based systems.29
These attributes are reflected in the central bank policies of different types
of countries. In the US and UK, the central bank has a relatively high degree
of independence which over time has evolved into a close alliance with
financial interests. These banks have therefore tended to favour restrictive
policies. In the bank-based systems, where there is a strong link between
bank and industry, biases toward restrictiveness tend to be weaker, though
Germany, with its combination of a bank-based system and a highly independent central bank, is a clear exception to this general tendency.30
Related to this, in the US/UK model, the independence of the financial
system has led to a strong international orientation for its financial sector.
In both cases, the domestic currency is used extensively for international
transactions, and a formidable industry has developed around international finance. Maintenance of confidence in the currency is therefore
given greater priority than in bank-based systems.31 It also appears that
the negative collateral effects of expansionary policy tend to be stronger
in the Anglo-American than the bank-based systems, though more
research is needed to establish this point. The most general problem is
that expansionary policy in capital market-based systems are more likely
to engender an allocation of credit toward speculative finance, such as
mergers, buyouts, and real-estate investments. Again, the bank-based
29
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systems have high degrees of speculation as well but at the core of the
credit market systems are institutional provisions for productive finance.
Financial Markets and Industrial Strategy
The advantage of bank-based systems here is that they are more amenable
to public credit allocation policies as a central focus of industrial strategy.32
Public credit allocation policies, in turn, are regarded in much of the literature as an effective instrument of industrial strategy. At the same time, in
considering the historical experience—particularly that of the US, which
has pursued extensive public credit policies—the actual causal relationships between a country’s financial structure, its degree of public credit
allocation, and its efforts and attainments in the area of industrial strategy,
are not clear-cut. That is, while it may appear that countries with bank-based
systems are more successful at implementing credit policies and industrial
strategy, this may primarily result from the fact that the same countries are
more actively engaged in both credit allocation and industrial strategy.
Relatedly, the historical record is not clear on the extent to which countries
with capital-market systems can deploy credit policies to compensate for
the capital market’s distortions—that is, engaging credit policies to replicate the desirable features of a bank-based system within the existing
capital market institutional framework. We return to these questions in
section three; as a prelude to that discussion, I now briefly review the experiences of various countries with credit policies and industrial strategies.
Zysman, for one, argues emphatically that public credit allocation policies
are necessary—indeed are the one essential tool—for successfully implementing industrial strategies. He says there are two reasons for this. The
first is that:
business decisions are hard to control or influence through administrative or regulatory rules. Those same decisions may, however, be
influenced by negotiation in which the payment for services rendered is unambiguously calculated in monetary terms.
Discretionary influence in industrial finance permits the government to deal within the framework of business decisions and to
affect the balance sheet directly.33
In addition, Zysman argues that public credit allocation is a universally
applicable policy instrument. As such, it ‘eliminates the need to find specific authority to influence specific decisions or to control an agency that
32
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has formal authority over a specific policy instrument.’ By comparison,
Zysman contends that tax policy is not nearly as effective a policy tool.
Taxes tend to operate on gross profits from earnings, and thus are an ex
post rather than ex ante incentive to pursue the priorities of the industrial
strategy. Tax policy is also less flexible; it can be reasonably used to target
categories of activity but not specific industrial ends.34
Despite differences of detail, there appear to be three basic common elements to public credit allocation policies among the countries that have
used such policies for financing an industrial strategy. To begin with, the
national government is the major initial recipient of the economy’s saving
supply. This is achieved through various mechanisms: in Japan, it is done
through the postal saving system, in France and Taiwan through the
public ownership of banks. In South Korea, public bank ownership was
supplemented by the government running persistent budget surpluses.
Through all these mechanisms, the state has power to act as the
economy’s principal financial intermediary.35
From here, the state is then able to utilize the disbursement of credit as a
policy tool. This can be done either by disbursing to private intermediaries, as is done in the Japanese system, or by the state making direct loans
to non-financial firms, as is done in France or Korea.36 Finally, powerful
state agencies—such as MITI in Japan and the Trésor in France—are in a
position to easily monitor the progress of their industrial strategy via their
oversight of the return flow of debt servicing by the borrowing units.
Experiences in the US and UK
The US and UK have had divergent experiences with respect to public credit
allocation and industrial strategy. Since the 1930s, the US has had considerable
34
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experience with public credit allocation policies. Indeed, considering all
forms of credit allocation—direct loans, guaranteed loans and governmentsponsored enterprise loans—the federal government is the largest creditor in
the US financial market, lending or underwriting on an annual basis between
about 15–30 per cent of all loans. Major recipients of funds have been the
housing sector, agriculture and education. These programmes, moreover,
have achieved considerable success relative to their stated goals. For example,
they have contributed substantially to the unprecedented access to home
ownership enjoyed by a high proportion of the non-wealthy in the US.37
The extent and successes of these programmes demonstrate that credit
policies can be implemented effectively within a capital market-based
financial system. At the same time, while these policies have been crucial
to the development of targeted sectors, they have not been used in the US
to guide an overall industrial strategy. It is therefore difficult to gauge the
extent to which a broader-based set of credit–industrial policies might be
frustrated by the structure of US financial markets. However, the success
of these programmes on their own terms suggests, contrary to Zysman,
that the ability to successfully implement credit allocation policies may
not depend significantly on whether a country’s financial system operates
as a bank- or capital market-based system.
As for the UK, the Labour party governments in the 1960s and 1970s did
attempt to pursue industrial strategies but without using public credit
allocation policies as part of that effort. The private capital market financial system thus acted as a barrier to the successful attainment of industrial policy. As Zysman writes:
Despite Labour’s hope of reforming capitalism, the government
had neither the instruments to do so nor a conception of how to
manipulate the industrial economy . . . Physical controls, which
proved unworkable, were seen as the only alternative to a reluctant
endorsement of the market system. Even nationalization did not
alter the fundamentally arm’s length relations between government
and the now-public companies . . .38
6. Objectionable Aspects of Bank-Based Systems
Despite the many successful features of bank-based systems, they also
have serious deficiencies, in particular from the perspective of constructing an egalitarian economic programme. The close, interlocking relationships between major firms, banks and government bureaucracies create
opportunities for clientism in credit allocation.39 Even more objection37
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able from the perspective of constructing an egalitarian programme is the
fact that public credit allocation policies have been most successfully
implemented in countries such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan where
government planners were completely independent from democratic
decision-making processes. In France, as in the East Asian economies,
government credit policies were independently established within the elite
Trésor unit of the Treasury but these policies were still subject to some
democratic pressures within the framework of the French polity. But for
just this reason, Cox argues that public credit allocation policies in France
were less successful than those in Japan: that is, the French were forced to
a far greater degree to use these policies to simply subsidize ailing industrial firms, avoiding the social costs of closing the plants.40 Regardless of
the accuracy of Cox’s assessment, the point he raises is important. He is
suggesting that the more the state is a site of political conflict, the greater
the likelihood that credit allocation policies will become an instrument for
competing, rent-seeking constituencies. Such observations raise questions
about the idea that public credit allocation policies can be successfully
implemented within a democratic framework—much less, as we are proposing, that such policies be the instrument for substantially extending
democracy and improving economic performance. This is the basic question that we consider in the next section.

III. Democratic Finance and Egalitarianism
1. Exit and Voice in Financial Systems
Hirschman’s exit/voice framework is important for this discussion
because it provides a vehicle for exploring the extent to which financial
systems can be used to increase equality as well as efficiency. Within this
framework, the Anglo-American system is one dominated by exit as a
means of exercising influence. Thus, dissatisfied shareholders or
bondholders of a firm will typically express displeasure by selling their
claims to the firm. A voice mechanism is incorporated into the US system
through its extensive system of public credit allocation but, again, these
programmes were designed with limited goals in mind and thus the voice
mechanism is correspondingly limited.
By contrast, the bank-based financial systems are premised on the exercise of influence by voice. Major financial institutions and state agencies
are actively involved in charting a non-financial firm’s long-term plans and
then committing themselves to the process of implementing those plans.
At the same time, as we have noted, the exercise of voice in these
economies is almost entirely confined to an elite grouping of capitalists,
political leaders and high-level bureaucrats.
We pursue two specific questions here. The first is how the exercise of
voice might operate within a democratic institutional framework while
still retaining the capacity that exists with elite bank-based/voice systems
to effectively solve incentive, coordination, and informational problems.
Such a democratic extension of the voice mechanism would necessarily
40
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depend upon the development of collective organizations seeking to
influence public credit allocation policies. These, in turn, could provide a
foundation for building what Cohen and Rodgers call ‘associative democracy,’ that is, the attainment of ‘egalitarian aims by improving the kinds
and extent of collective organization available to citizens’.41 The second
question, which we take up in the next section, is whether voice-dominated financial systems could be extended still further in an egalitarian
direction, specifically to serve, in a manner suggested by Bardhan and
Roemer, as a foundation for market socialist economies.42
Problems with Exit-Dominated Systems
Hirschman himself discussed the Anglo-American financial model as an
example of an exit-dominated system, and recognized the costs associated with such a system. He writes:
When the management of a corporation deteriorates, the first reaction of the best-informed stockholders is to look around for the
stock of better-managed companies. In thus orienting themselves
toward exit, rather than voice, investors are said to follow the Wall
Street rule that ‘if you do not like the management you should sell
your stock.’ According to a well-known manual this rule ‘results in
perpetuating bad management and bad policies.’ Naturally it is not
so much the Wall Street rule that is at fault as the ready availability
of alternative investment opportunities in the stock market which
makes any resort to voice rather than to exit unthinkable for any but
the most committed stockholder.43
To some extent, the merger movement of the 1980s can be interpreted as
an attempt to overcome the hegemony of the exit option and create a
vehicle for voice in the Anglo-American financial systems. It was a failed
attempt, as we have seen, both in its own terms, because its enormous
costs far exceeded its benefits, but also, more broadly, because of its
highly constricted conception of which groups deserved to exercise voice
(shareholders) and which should be excluded (all stakeholders).
Combining Exit and Voice
While Hirschman’s argument points toward the benefits of a strong voice
option, he also recognizes that the most favourable situation is one that
achieves an appropriate balance between exit and voice. Reaching such a
balance, however, is difficult. To begin with, voice can atrophy in situations when both options are available but exit is highly accessible.
Consider, for example, an important case in which a voice mechanism was
injected into the exit-dominated US financial system. This is the experience since 1977 with the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). Under the
terms of the CRA, banks are obliged to provide funds for the communities
41
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in which they operate. However, this regulation exists within a highly
unfavourable environment. The banks, in dealing with small-scale
borrowers, generally seek to package standardized loans into marketable
securities for the national and global market. Almost by definition, loans
that bring new opportunities to poor communities will tend not to meet
the conditions of the standardized loans. In addition, local communities
have no institutional means of monitoring bank compliance with the law.
Not surprisingly, the CRA has had little impact on bank lending practices.44
It follows that exit options must be limited in order that voice be effective.
But it is also true that an environment which lacks a credible exit option is
also not viable. Without the exit option, the sanctions one can threaten
when expressing dissatisfaction will carry little credibility.45 Considering
financial markets, the bifurcated Japanese market offers a useful model.
There, as we have seen, controlling blocks of firms are closely held within
Keiretsu, who manage their interlocking companies through the exercise
of voice. At the same time, because roughly 40 per cent of financial assets
are publicly traded, a viable exit option is provided which also transmits
the public market’s assessment of a firm’s performance. This also creates
wide opportunities for speculative finance, but they generally do not
diminish the ‘financial commitment’ (referring again to Lazonick’s term)
of the Keiretsu to the long-term operations of a firm.
These observations point toward an important generalization: what is
crucial in organizing an efficient financial system is not whether the
system is bank- or capital market-based, but rather, how to attain the
appropriate mix of voice and exit. We observe that a strong voice option
is needed to resolve the incentive, coordination, and informational problems in a financial system in a way that encourages long time horizons and
financial stability. But a viable exit option must also exist to at least lend
weight to dissatisfied voices. Posing the issue this way allows for greater
flexibility—and even optimism—in addressing policy issues. The initial
policy problem is not to anoint one system (bank-based) while rejecting
the other (capital market-based), for both have evolved in various countries over long periods of history and are unlikely to be displaced in toto.
The actual challenge appears rather more manageable: how, within given
existing institutional environments, can voice be strengthened sufficiently
without smothering exit.
2. Political Power and the Exercise of Voice
Of course, giving priority to voice over exit does not at all address the
issue of whose voice is being empowered. In existing bank-based systems,
as we have discussed, the extension of the voice option is quite limited.
Can voice-dominant financial systems be viable when the voice option is
substantially extended?
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In considering this question, it will be useful to consider a formulation by
Edward Banfield to which Hirschman refers: ‘The effort an interested
party makes to put its case before the decision maker will be in proportion
to the advantage to be gained from a favourable outcome multiplied by
the probability of influencing the decision’.46 Drawing from this framework, the challenge can be defined as developing institutions through
which there is both advantage to be gained from exercising voice and a
good probability that advantage will be so gained. In capitalist societies, of
course, the wealthy have far greater means to organize effective voice
mechanisms. Indeed, a legitimate criticism of efforts to extend the voice
option is that this will merely generate new vehicles for rent-seeking—and
attaining—by the wealthy. This is why means to strengthen associative
democracy are crucial components of strengthening the voice option,
especially, as Cohen and Rodgers write, ‘efforts to promote the organized
representation of excluded interests’.47 How can this be done within
financial systems?
A dramatic intervention in this direction would be to nationalize a substantial proportion of a country’s financial institutions. We put aside
whether such a strategy is politically feasible. However, an even more
basic concern is whether a nationalization strategy, on its own, is likely to
change the structure of a country’s financial institutions in any significant
way, and specifically whether it is likely to promote the extension of voice.
The French experience is instructive. Roughly half of the French banking
system has been nationalized since the 1940s and the Mitterand government nationalized another 30 per cent after coming to power in 1981.
Nevertheless, as Lipietz, among others, has written, the financial system
operated in a manner essentially indistinguishable from private banks,
both before and after 1981.48 Moreover, the Mitterand government’s decision to nationalize was never linked to a broader strategy of financial
market democratization or even experimentation. Quite the contrary: the
government’s first major policy decision was to defend financial orthodoxy with respect to the exchange rate, a position it consistently maintained thereafter.49
A nationalization policy thus begs the question of how to promote a
democratic voice within financial institutions. More to the point are a
range of proposals that have been developed recently which, given existing property relations, focus on specific methods of extending the voice
mechanism. For illustration, I will cite some that have been developed primarily within the US context, but the basic approach is generalizable
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beyond this one case. I consider these proposals in terms of both of
Banfield’s criteria for evaluating voice mechanisms: whether they provide
means of increasing the probability of influencing decisions and whether
they increase the advantages to be gained from favourable decisions.
3. Influencing Decisions Through Democratic Voice
Beginning in the area of corporate governance, Block has developed a
fairly specific proposal for dramatically changing the relevant legal structure. He suggests that the boards of directors of public corporations
consist of, for example, 35 per cent employers, 35 per cent asset holders,
and 30 per cent others, perhaps including consumers or community representatives. This proposal, as Block points out, would ‘initially leave much of
the corporation’s day-to-day operations unchanged’.50 Firms would still
have to sell products in competitive markets, and would rely on labour
markets in supplying workers. Given the new governance structure, the
relationship that the firm has with these markets would undoubtedly evolve
over time. Nevertheless, how it does so would remain flexible: Block makes
no assumptions as to how operations would be affected by the democratic
governance structure. The only certainty is that creating the democraticvoice mechanism would separate the firm’s decision making from the influence of the wealthy, in particular, the firms’ largest shareholders.
Considering workers’ pension funds—the largest saving vehicle in the US,
incorporating one-third of the economy’s financial assets—Barber and
Ghilarducci take an approach similar to that of Block.51 They propose
that the authority of fund participants themselves over the funds’ investment decisions be increased substantially. This would be achieved by
mandating elected participant representation on corporate pension-fund
boards. Under current practice, pension-fund managers and government
regulators almost always interpret existing regulations in the most restrictive way, and thereby treat their fiduciary responsibility as equivalent to
that for incompetent heirs. That is, all authority rests with the managers,
none with the fund participants. Barber and Ghilarducci argue that significant steps toward more democratic practices could be implemented even
under existing laws.
A variety of proposals have also been advanced to bring greater accountability to the Federal Reserve system, and thereby weaken its independence from democratic political pressures. One proposal is to institute
direct elections of the Boards of Directors of the Federal Reserve Banks
in each bank region. At present, the regional bank boards are selected by
officers of private member banks of the system and by the Governors of
the system in Washington.52
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4. Gaining Advantage Through Democratic Voice
However useful on their own terms, none of these proposals to increase
democratic-voice mechanisms directly address Banfield’s criteria of
increasing the advantages to be gained by favourable outcomes. In countries that already have extensive public credit allocation systems or, as
with Germany, a voice-dominated private system, democratizing these
existing voice mechanisms may itself bring more favourable outcomes.
However, within private capital market-based systems such as the US and
UK, such democratic interventions would have little impact unless a broad
system of public credit allocation was concurrently introduced.
The standard ‘market failure’ justification for the public credit policies
flows from the substantial divergence between the social as opposed to
the private costs and benefits of many types of lending flows.53 Thus, for
example, the effects on employment and community development of
loans to finance low-income housing will be quite different than loans to
finance corporate takeovers. But the benefits of the low-income housing
loan will not accrue solely, or perhaps even primarily, to the investor
undertaking the project or the bank but will be spread widely throughout
a community. In such cases, a public authority, representing the larger
community, will need to subsidize the housing loan over the takeover
loan. A literature which considers many of the practical issues in pursuing
such public credit policies has developed in recent years. Let us briefly
consider some of these discussions in the areas of pension-fund investing, as well as, more broadly, regulatory, monetary and fiscal policy.
Pension Funds
A fairly extensive literature has developed which recognizes that, in principle, a case for incorporating social costs and benefits of pension-fund
investing flows readily from the fact that fund participants—as workers
tied to specific communities—are likely to be the beneficiaries of the
spill-over employment and community effects of these investments.54 At
the same time, such efforts also face serious pitfalls. The basic problem is
that the full social benefits of a given pension-fund investment are not
likely to be captured by the participants of a given fund. Other communities and workers will also likely enjoy benefits, but without having to
shoulder any of the corresponding costs. As a result, for the pension-fund
participants themselves, the fund earns a lower rate of return than they
would have through following orthodox investment criteria. Since the
1970s in the US, many instances have been cited where the funds did
indeed earn a lower return or incurred higher risks in supporting investments whose social benefits were diffuse.
These criticisms must, however, be seen within a broader context. First,
pension funds managed according to the standards of orthodox finance
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have themselves performed quite poorly in the 1980s as financial markets
became increasingly speculative. According to one study, pension funds
earned on average 2.6 per cent less than the average of the Standard and
Poor’s 500 index, and this before subtracting management fees that averaged 0.5 per cent of assets. Such a performance suggests that the funds
should simply fire their managers and purchase an index fund such as that
for the Standard and Poor’s 500. The problem here is that in so doing, the
fund participants, far from increasing their control over the allocation of
their own pensions, would then have completely surrendered their
authority to the vagaries of the market.
The alternative would be to use policy to create market conditions supportive of social investment criteria. Barber and Ghilarducci point out
that, as experience has been gained and when governments have been
supportive, many efforts at social investing of pension funds have been
successful. To solidify these successes, and to advance similar initiatives
toward the construction of a democratic voice-led financial structure,
broader supportive measures will be needed in the areas of regulatory,
central bank and fiscal policy.55
Financial Regulation
Let us consider again the Community Reinvestment Act, as it is one
recent regulatory initiative in the US in which something akin to a democratic-voice agenda has at least been put into law, if not practice. One
major problem with the CRA is that it applies only to banks. The banks
legitimately claim that they are placed at a competitive disadvantage relative to other intermediaries. This disadvantage is then used as one argument for not enforcing the law. A simple but dramatic means of
strengthening the CRA would thus be to extend its requirements to all
intermediaries—to ‘level the playing field upward’ for all financial institutions.56 As proposed by D’Arista and Schlesinger, such an upward leveling
of regulatory requirements could be accomplished fairly readily. The
primary legal change would entail a uniform licensing system for all inter55
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mediaries, which would include all institutions that accept deposits from
the public and make loans or purchase equity with those funds. All such
institutions would then be required to maintain some form of a ‘community investment’ portfolio.57
Such a change would also clearly require a revision of the notion of a
‘community portfolio’: the proposal would obviously not aim to have
‘communities’ already favoured with heavy concentrations of financial
institutions, such as Wall Street, showered with new lending opportunities
while areas with few financial institutions are starved for funds. In
keeping with the spirit of the CRA, the principle underlying its broadening
would have to be that financial institutions must take into account the
social spillover effects of their loan portfolio in order to comply with the
terms of their charters. Implementing this idea on a broad scale could
perhaps be best accomplished within the framework of central bank
policy.
Central Bank Policy
With respect to the Federal Reserve, fairly simple measures could go far to
support social criteria for credit allocation and investment, and thereby
also complement policies to extend democratic accountability within the
central bank. At present, the Fed operates though two basic policy instruments: open-market operations, which is the buying and selling of
government securities in ‘the open market’ to change short-term interest
rates; and ‘discount-window policy’ through which the regional Federal
Reserve banks make loans directly to banks seeking additional cash
reserves. Both policy instruments are exclusively concerned with shortrun movements of interest rates and credit aggregates. And yet, as a result
of the experiences over the past twenty years with financial innovation,
deregulation and globalization, the Federal Reserve’s ability to achieve
even their short-term policy aims has diminished.58
At the same time, I have argued elsewhere that two relatively simple policy
innovations could substantially increase the central bank’s ability to influence longer-term credit allocation patterns, including policies targeted at
social-lending criteria.59 The first policy change would be to increase the
role of discount-window lending relative to open market operations. This
will give the regional Federal Reserve Banks, each of which operates its
own discount window, more direct regulatory authority over the lending
activities of private intermediaries, enabling them to promote longer time
horizons and financial stability, as well as a set of social-lending criteria
flowing from, for example, a targeted pension-fund investment strategy. It
will also redistribute Federal Reserve decision-making power downward,
creating more effective channels for accountability. The second suggestion is to establish differential asset–reserve requirements for all US intermediaries. Preferred uses of credit, established by the calculation of social
57
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costs and benefits of loans, would then become significantly less costly
than non-preferred uses of funds. This subsidy for socially desirable loans
would then be one simple way to generalize the social-lending criteria
embodied in an expanded Community Reinvestment Act or a targeted
pension-fund investment strategy.
Securities Transaction Tax
The aim of such a tax would be to reduce speculative financial activity by
raising the costs of trading financial assets. This would be done by subjecting all financial asset trades to a small tax. The tax rate would be low
enough that it would be negligible in cases where assets were purchased
and held for lengthy periods. The burden of the tax would only be felt
among those who are frequent traders.
One of the advantages of this proposal is that, even if it failed to significantly reduce speculative trading, it would become a formidable
source of government revenue, which could in turn finance, for
example, a public investment programme. Baker, Pollin and Schaberg
estimate that, given the level of trading in the current US securities
markets, a tax of 0.5 per cent on equities which was then scaled down
appropriately for all bonds and derivative instruments, would raise
roughly $30 billion a year in revenue, even if trading volume fell by onehalf.60
Such taxes have operated in many countries, including France, Germany,
the Netherlands, and Japan. In recent years, however, they have been
largely abandoned, in response to two arguments: that financial markets
have become too complex to enable the tax to be imposed equitably
across the various markets; and that global financial integration forces
countries to minimize taxes, and other costs, to potential investors or
else lose those funds to countries with lower taxes. However, neither of
these considerations present insurmountable barriers to designing a
workable tax. As noted above, the 0.5 per cent tax rate on equities would
not be applied uniformly to all markets, but would rather be scaled
downward in the bond and derivative markets according to the maturity
of various instruments. To discourage investors from leaving the US
market, the tax should be levied on all trades made by US taxpayers,
regardless of the country in which the trade occurred, just as income tax
is levied on all income, not just that earned in the US. Such a tax would
of course operate more effectively in conjunction with a similar tax, as
proposed by James Tobin, on foreign exchange trading in which all
countries cooperate.61 However, experiences with purely domestic versions of the tax make clear that they can function effectively within this
more narrow context, especially in a country such as the US with a deep
market for domestic securities.
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Are These Proposals Utopian?
The specific policy ideas sketched here are drawn entirely from programmes that have been used, or at least seriously considered, in the US or
other advanced capitalist economies. Considered in technical terms, they
are therefore feasible in that they do not represent a serious departure
from existing institutional or policy arrangements. They are also adaptable
to the existing political realities in a country, in that they could be implemented in stages, beginning with the institutional configuration already in
place.
At the same time, considered as a whole, there is no doubt that such
extensions of democratic voice would entail a substantial downward shift
in economic power, and would therefore be resisted by the political and
economic elite. In particular, one would expect elite groups to persistently
seek to undermine the effectiveness of any such policies once they were
enacted into law, as has been done in the US with the Community
Reinvestment Act. This raises the issue posed by Coakley and Harris for
the UK and Lipietz for France: whether public ownership of financial
institutions remains an imperative, not as an end in itself, but as the means
of implementing the types of egalitarian reforms outlined here.62 We will
once again leave aside the political dimensions of that question, though
they are obviously of fundamental importance, and turn instead to the
implied economic issue: how a voice-dominated financial system would
operate under public ownership.

IV. Public Ownership and Credit Policies
i. The Bardan/Roemer Model of Market Socialism
Bardhan and Roemer have argued that what I am calling a voice-led
public credit allocation system can be used as the central organizing
institution for a workable market socialist economy.63 Their proposal
incorporates levels of public ownership beyond that of the financial
sector to include large-scale non-financial enterprises as well. But the
general thrust of their proposal brings into focus issues relevant for
various types of nationalization strategies. More generally, as I discuss
below, their approach can be viewed as one strategy within a range of
alternatives for developing a framework of democratic voice in financial
systems.
Bardhan and Roemer argue that a market socialist economy is one in
which the economy’s large-scale productive assets are publicly owned in
some fashion. The profits from these enterprises are distributed equally
among the public. The fundamental challenge for such an economy is the
same as that which was never successfully resolved in the former
Communist economies: how to resolve the principal–agent problem
between managers as agents and the widely dispersed firm owners—the
state and ultimately the citizenry—as principals.
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Since Bardhan and Roemer view this problem as equivalent to that between
owners and managers in corporate capitalism, they argue that its most efficient resolution will emulate the successful resolutions that have occurred
in capitalist economies—through a set of voice-led financial institutions
with a competitive managerial labour market and clear standards for managerial success. They further argue that resolving the system’s incentive
problems will establish strong safeguards against what Kornai has termed
‘soft budget constraints’—the means through which governments will
deviate from established budgetary, tax and pricing policies to bail out inefficient firms rather than allow them to fail.64 Bardhan and Roemer devote
less attention to the ways in which voice-led financial systems might also
effectively resolve macroeconomic coordination and information problems though, as I discuss below, these advantages of a voice-led system
should also be transferrable to economies dominated by public ownership.
Bardhan and Roemer have outlined a set of financial institutions which
draw heavily from the Japanese Keiretsu system and other existing voicedominated systems. For example, in their model that is most closely akin to
a Keiretsu system, firms are organized as joint-stock companies—owned
by their workers, other public companies within their group and the main
investment bank which finances the group and oversees its activities. There
could also be other subsidiary owners, including pension funds and insurance companies. The state would be the major owner of the banks, pension
funds, and insurance companies. In this case there would be several monitors of the firm’s activities: the worker-owners, the workers and managers
of the other firms in the same industrial group, the managers of the
pension funds and insurance companies, and most importantly, the managers of the main bank. As the primary suppliers of funds for the non-financial firms, the bank managers would have responsibility for financing the
individual group and maintaining its level of performance. In particular,
the shares of the large firms can be sold to the main bank. The main bank
will therefore receive information on firm performance based on their own
evaluations as well as those of other institutions.
The primary source of external finance in this arrangement would be the
banks which are themselves publicly owned. Funds could thus be readily
channeled from the state, via the public banks, to the firms. How then
could these systems avoid the problem of soft budget constraints?
Bardhan and Roemer point to three main safeguards. The most important
is the incentive system for managers. Bank managers who are forced to
plead with the state for bail-out funds will damage their reputation in the
process. Moreover, the state would have to make credible pre-commitments to performance standards, and be prepared to liquidate businesses
which fail to meet them. Finally, the economy would be open to international competition.65 This will create an external source of accountability
for the firms and the system as a whole.
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2. Exit/Voice Finance and Alternative Property Relations
The Bardhan/Roemer proposals are essentially a means of stretching the
egalitarian possibilities of voice-dominated financial systems by combining the democratic features of a voice system with an egalitarian redistribution of property rights. The relationship between this proposal and the
others we have surveyed is summarized in the Table (p. 61). The rows of
the matrix characterize the three types of financial systems: exit-dominated, elite voice-dominated, and democratic-voice systems. The columns
characterize predominant property arrangements—private, mixed, and
public. Various historical and existing systems are situated along the first
two rows. The proposals we have discussed are along the bottom row,
since all include a democratic-voice mechanism, but are distinguished by
their predominant system of property ownership.
It becomes clear from this figure that the one change for which there is no
equivalent experience is the movement down the table toward a democratic-voice mechanism. This raises the question of whether the successes of
the elite-voice systems are transferable to democratic-voice systems. At
the same time, the proposals represented in the cell which combines
democratic voice with predominantly private ownership are designed to
be implemented incrementally as a reformist programme within the existing exit- and elite voice-led capitalist systems located in the upper cells of
the matrix. Movements toward the Bardhan/Roemer proposals would
entail a more substantial transformation relative to the existing capitalist
economies, though not necessarily to the former Soviet-type economies.
In any case, such movements pose the additional issue of whether combining democratic voice with public ownership would further erode the
benefits of the elite-voice systems. These are the issues to which we now
turn.
3. Democratic Finance, Public Ownership and Critique of Market
Socialism
The question of whether democratic financial systems can retain the efficiency features of the elite-dominated voice systems can be evaluated
within a broader and more venerable debate: whether a market economy’s
sources of efficiency can be replicated within any egalitarian economic
arrangement. This question has received considerable attention within
debates over the viability of market socialism. Oscar Lange was of course
the first to offer a model showing that a market socialist economy could
function efficiently. He demonstrated that in an economy with free consumer choice, but where the means of production are publicly owned, the
price mechanism could still be deployed for solving the informational
problems associated with price formation and resource allocation.66
Lange was attacked by Hayek, who held that his model, while internally
consistent, nevertheless overlooked the fundamental source of capitalism’s efficiency. This was not its ability to allocate resources through competitive price formation, but rather the nature of its property rights
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system. In particular, Hayek held that the system of private property
encourages technical progress which, in turn, was the source of capitalism’s dynamism.67 It has been recently argued, moreover, most carefully
by Howard and King, that this Hayekian critique of market socialism in
fact parallels Marx’s own understanding of the sources of capitalism’s
dynamism. Howard and King write that:
Disregarding the difference in language, Marx and Hayek are in
agreement on two fundamental matters concerning the nature of
capitalist social relations. First the strength of capitalism lies in its
dynamic transformative power, not its ability to engender allocations which satisfy static utilitarian welfare criteria. Second, capitalism is especially effective in raising productivity.68
From this perspective, capitalism engenders efficiency because its system
of property relations provides freedom to capitalists to develop new
methods of production and discard existing techniques, and, similarly, to
deploy and discard employees as needed. Moreover, the system provides a
powerful incentive structure for capitalists, by holding out formidable
material rewards for those who succeed in raising productivity through
innovation, and severe punishments for those who fail.
For Howard and King, it is clear that a market socialist economy cannot
allow private individuals this degree of freedom in choosing methods of
production and especially in hiring and firing workers. It cannot therefore
replicate the basic source of capitalism’s efficiency, and will thus
inevitably be out-competed by an economy with capitalist private property relations. Howard and King argue that if market socialist economies
were able to compete with capitalist economies in terms of innovation
and productivity, then they should have been emerging embryonically
within contemporary capitalism.
4. How Would a Democratic-Voice System Fare?
Clearly, the types of concerns raised by Howard and King and the related
critical literature on market socialism apply most directly to the
Bardhan/Roemer version of a democratic-voice financial system, since
theirs is explicitly a model of market socialism dominated by public ownership. Nevertheless, the general issues relating to the sources of capitalist efficiency are crucial to all versions of a democratic-voice dominated
financial system. The departure point of the various democratic financial
arrangements is that they are not relying on the market as a mere computer analogue (as Patnaik uses the term),69 guiding price formation and
resource allocation. Rather, they are centered around a set of institutional
relationships for solving the incentive, coordination and informational
problems that result within large-scale enterprises and, more broadly,
within modern economies at the macro level, regardless of the property
67
F.A. Hayek, ‘Socialist Calculation: The Competitive “Solution”’, Economica, 7,
1940, pp. 125–49, and The Fatal Conceit, Chicago 1988.
68
Michael Howard and John E. King, ‘Is Socialism Feasible? An Analysis in Terms
of Historical Materialism’, Review of Political Economy, vol. 6, no. 2, (1994) p. 143.
69
Prabhat Patnaik, Economics and Egalitarianism, New Dehli 1991.

56

forms around which these economies are organized. As such, these voicedominated systems are able to transcend the criticisms of Lange-type
market socialist schemes.70
First, as we have seen, the existing elite-voice-dominated financial
systems are more efficient than the exit systems in promoting longterm productivity growth, and—focusing primarily now at the macro
level which Bardhan and Roemer did not address—in supporting productive investment, reducing financial fragility and mitigating the
effects of speculation. That is, elite-voice-led systems do indeed outperform the exit-led systems according to Howard and King’s yardstick
of productivity and innovation.71 In addition, because voice-dominated
systems have functioned well in various institutional settings, it is fair
to say that they have met Howard and King’s more stringent test: they
have emerged within the interstices of capitalism, and have survived
and grown precisely because they outperform exit-dominated financial
systems. It is true that part of the basis for their success has been the
willingness of the elite class to pursue longer-term ‘organizational
capabilities’ strategies to high performance, thereby foregoing a
shorter-term route to rewards through following financial market indicators. This suggests that if the elite classes perceived the short-term
gains of a financial market strategy were rising significantly in relative
terms, it may become increasingly difficult to maintain an elite consensus around a voice system. On the other hand, were the elite-voice
systems to be substantially democratized, one of the premises behind
such a transformation would have to be to create a new political coalition committed to nurturing the long-term advantages of a voice
model.
Could a democratic-voice model function without relying upon
unemployment and allied punishments as sources of efficiency?
Several points are relevant here. First, to the extent that the purpose
of unemployment is to preserve the capitalists relative bargaining
70
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power in labour markets, any significant extension of public ownership and democratic-voice should reduce that source of pressure for
unemployment. Second, to the extent that unemployment is associated
with macroeconomic fluctuations independent of labour market
imperatives, we have seen that the voice-dominated financial systems
perform better at maintaining a stable macro environment. Operating
with a more stable macro economy, the voice-led economies are then
better able to effectively utilize the traditional tools of fiscal and
monetary policy.
Could the democratic-voice systems also maintain the set of microincentives available to an elite-voice system? Bardhan and Roemer
suggest that they could, as long as the economy is open to international
competition, the government is committed to maintaining clear performance standards and hard budget constraints, and, most importantly,
there exists a competitive managerial labour market. However
Putterman, and Roland and Sekkat contend that the managerial labour
market will not be efficient within a Bardhan/Roemer type public ownership framework, and their points raise concerns about all democraticvoice systems.72
The first argument, emphasized by Putterman, is that citizens in general
are too diffuse a group as owners. They will have neither adequate
information nor the motivation to serve as effective monitors of managerial performance. While this is a serious concern, it is once again the same
problem that exists within a private capital market system. Putterman
cites the Jensen-type solution to this problem within a capital market
system, that is, the monitoring that occurs via the market for corporate
control. But as we have seen, the more efficient and potentially more
egalitarian solution is a voice-dominated financial system. Moreover,
encouraging strong citizen associations within the voice-dominated
system will increase the effectiveness with which citizens monitor managerial performance.
The second concern, stressed by Roland and Sekkat, is that any system
dominated by public ownership will have foreclosed the exit option for
managers dissatisfied with a career in the public sector. Predominant
public ownership will put the state in the position of a monopsonist
relative to the managerial labour market, giving the government ‘holdup’ power over the careers of managers. This is a strong argument, but
it applies fully only to a system with complete public ownership. What
their position points toward is the relative merits of arrangements
somewhere in the middle cell of the last row of Table 1–-that is, a
democratic-voice dominated system with both public and private ownership of corporations. This is likely to provide both a favourable
environment for innovations in voice-dominated finance while also preventing the state from becoming a monopsonist in the managerial
labour market.
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V. Conclusion
Democratic-voice-led financial systems offer a highly promising foundation on which to reconstruct an egalitarian economic policy agenda. Such
an approach, first of all, is premised on what Patnaik argues is the fundamental requirement for an egalitarian economy, ‘the creation of appropriate institutions for the active participation of the working class in
economic and political life’.73 In addition, this approach is highly flexible.
It can be developed on the basis of existing institutional arrangements
within capitalist economies, and thus, depending on political circumstances, can be implemented in varying increments on the foundation of
the existing institutions. Moreover, this policy apparatus can be effectively
adapted to diverse property ownership systems, ranging from privateownership economies such as the contemporary US to predominantly
public-ownership systems such as still exist in most of Eastern Europe or
as envisaged by Bardhan and Roemer.
Of course, capitalists and their political allies will resist any serious
encroachments on their prerogatives in financial markets. Democraticvoice systems will not be implemented on the basis of their compelling
logic alone. This is why we have pursued Coakley and Harris’s suggestion
that public ownership of major financial institutions may be necessary,
not as an end in itself, but as the basis for implementing effective democratic credit policies. Even so, in countries such as the US where public
ownership of the financial system is not politically feasible, important elements of a democratic-voice agenda are still possible. Programmes such
as community reinvestment, the targeting of pension-fund investments,
and changing both the operating goals and degree of accountability of
the central bank are politically feasible even within the existing US
economy and should be primary concerns of progressive movements. In
addition, by working to build such policy initiatives within private financial systems, we gain experience and understanding about the limits of
reform under private financial systems.
The key to the viability of the democratic-voice approach is that it is able
to build upon the solution of elite voice-dominated financial systems to
the incentive, coordination and information problems existing in all
economies. We saw that the elite voice/bank-based model operates more
efficiently than exit-based systems in promoting compatible goals
between owners and managers of firms. These features of the elite-voice
model should be transferrable to democratic-voice systems.
Much, if not most, economic activity within any version of the democratic-voice model would still be conducted through markets. However, the
democratic-voice model is not vulnerable to the legitimate critique of the
Langeian market socialist model, that such a model employs markets as a
mere computer analogue, neglecting the social relationships underlying
them. At the same time, to the extent that the democratic-voice model
operates effectively, it should also be able to utilize traditional macro
policy tools—indeed, it should be better positioned to use them than
more free-market oriented economies—to minimize unemployment.
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More importantly, it should be well positioned to trade off the efficiency
‘benefits’ of unemployment with alternative sources of efficiency.
Are voice-dominated financial systems viable within increasingly globalized markets?74 It is true that advanced capitalist economies with bankbased systems, such as Japan, France, and Germany, have followed the
worldwide trend since the 1970s in liberalizing their financial systems.
Regulatory reforms in Japan and France have, for example, increased the
ability of commercial banks to participate in capital markets. In Germany,
where banks have always been active in capital markets, deregulation has
endorsed the use of new financial instruments and the participation of
foreign banks in domestic capital markets.75 In South Korea and other
East Asian economies there has been general movement since the 1970s
toward interest rate deregulation, securitization of financial markets, and
relaxation of regulatory standards.76
At the same time, fundamental elements of the bank–based systems have
remained intact. For example, close bank–industry relationships, such as
the Japanese Keiretsu system, have not eroded, despite security market
liberalization. In addition, state involvement in credit allocation remains
strong in the bank-based systems—with the exception of Germany,
which has never relied on this mechanism. The governments of bankbased systems continue to receive a substantial proportion, if not the
majority, of their economies’ saving through postal saving systems and
similar forms of public intermediation. Given this source of funds, the
governments are able to retain considerable influence in credit allocation
decisions, which they exercise through their respective planning agencies.77 The fact that, over the late 1980s, active markets for corporate
control did not develop in the traditional bank-based financial systems
indicates that liberalization has not subverted these countries ‘dedicated
capital’ financial relationships. It is not clear whether these voice-dominated institutional forms will surrender to the pressures of global financial markets over time. For this to happen would require that the
continued financial deepening generated through globalization would
create ever greater—and finally irresistible—profit opportunities through
‘fluid’ investment strategies.
In short, we leave as an open question the extent to which globalization
represents a threat to the future viability of existing bank-based systems,
to say nothing of democratic-voice policies. Nevertheless, the existing
Japanese model of a bifurcated system—with an open segment that is
free to pursue all market opportunities and a controlled ‘dedicated capital’
sector—appears to offer the outlines of a solution that is viable both for
the existing bank-based systems, and, more importantly, for the develop74
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ment of democratic-voice policies that a progressive movement would
want to pursue. Beyond this, the issue must be evaluated in political terms.
If globalization is indeed destructive of egalitarianism, then progressive
political movements will have to develop economic programmes that can
neutralize these forces while simultaneously advancing egalitarian economic arrangements that promote both micro efficiency and macro
stability. My contention is that an approach guided by democratic-voice
financial policies can provide the foundation for such an economic programme.
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